Thursday, June 25, 2020

An Analysis Of The Egyptian Stock Market Finance Essay - Free Essay Example

Dividend policy and the factors behind its determination are considered to be a widely tackled topic in the world of modern finance given the indefinite theories supporting its crucial impact on the firms value and hence arousing great controversy. Most of the research implemented tackled developed markets as opposed to emerging markets which are believed to add a lot to the debate that deeply roots to the seventies given the different nature and lack of efficiency that emerging markets possess and hence adds to the attractiveness of the debate. This paper will mainly cover the key determinates to the dividend policy and how these determinants impact its formation in the most tradable listed companies in the Egyptian stock market over a period of five years 2006-2011 in the first research done by the author. This paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 deals with literature review tapping on its theoretical and historical background. Chapter 3 deeply covers methodology, research question, objectives, and hypothesis analysis. Chapter 4 Data Analysis, Results and recommendations. Keywords: Dividend Policy, Dividend theories, Ownership Structure (Capital Structure), Cash Flow, leverage, Taxes, Sector, Profitability. Literature Review Theoretical background There are various researches and studies which examine a number of theories related to determinant of dividend policy. The main objectives of these theories and studies were to examine and find correlation between firm characteristics and dividend policy. Companies pays dividend when it has sufficient internal sources of funding, if companies reduce dividend payout the company owners may become worried about the company performance , since they consider it as a signal of company poor performance and low profits which leads to decline in stock price. According to the outcome model, dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to pay cash, while as per the Substitute model, insiders interested in issuing equity. In general, higher dividends payouts lead to lower Retained Earnings and Capital Gain and vice versa, leaving total wealth of shareholders unchanged. In certain countries, shareholders are taxed more heavily on dividends receipts th an on capital gain. Firms can signal future profitability through paying dividends. Firms that initiate dividends, experience share price increases, and vice versa. Recently an idea has been focused on, implementing that dividends policies address agency problems between corporate insiders and outside shareholders. This theory implies that unless profits are paid, it might be diverted by the insiders for personal use, or which may result in commitment to unprofitable projects with benefits to those insiders. Dividend Theoretical back ground. Agency Theory. Insiders, who control corporate assets, can use these assets for purposes that are detrimental to the interest of outside investors. They also can use corporate assets to pursue investment strategies that yield them personal benefits of control. Through dividends, insiders return corporate earnings to investors and wont be able to using such earnings to benefit themselves. This is because managers who possess cash would like to reinvest in projects that will yield them personal benefits Also paying dividends exposes companies to the possible need to come to the capital markets in the future to raise external funds. Paying dividends result in lesser cash flow available in the hands of insiders (managers), which mitigate their ability to spend on projects which benefit their own interest. Dividends could serve as a tool to reduce or eliminate agency cost, in addition companies will pay lower dividend when manager holds equity in the company. If mangers hold a position in the company equity it will defiantly affect the dividend policy. Chen Steiner (1999). , Al-Najjar and Hussainey2009. Agency cost might be reduced if insiders boost their share in the company by making the managers the eventual owners of company, yet this ultimate ownership by management will lead to a conflict of interest between the management and outsiders since the insiders will try to retain more cash under their management either by decreasing payment of dividends or by continuously paying out dividends at a at low level bearing in mind the tax consideration above in developed markets (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Directors manage the companies through a contract between the shareholders and managers, in which the mangers have power and authority to manage the company in order to maximize shareholders wealth in return of a specific benefit. Jensen and Meckling (1976). If inside managers increase their common stock-ownership in the company, they will be keen on aligning th eir interest with shareholders interests; this will result in reducing equity agency cost. The higher common stocks held by managers, the more likely such owner-managers act in the interests of Shareholders and work on optimizing the companys value. Thus, a higher level of insider ownership will lead to lower agency problems and reduces the role of dividends as a monitoring tool to control for agency cost Controlling shareholders can effectively determine the decisions of the managers, and can implement policies that benefit themselves at the expense of the minority shareholders The main target of Corporate Governance is mainly reaching a compromise between the company management and the shareholders,( Jiraporn et al. (2008). If the company has a strong a well-established corporate governance regulations investors will be paid high dividend, both are positively correlated .Michaely and Roberts (2006) . Kowalewski et al. (2007). Companies with qualified and quality corporate governance team are more capable of controlling Agency cost and reducing them, thus paying more and higher dividends. Investors would prefer to maintain the companys debt ratio to the lowest level possible, out of belief that it will results in more dividends to them and thus it will reduce cash available to managers (Jensen 2009a , Meckling 1976). Also paying dividends exposes companies to the possible need to come to the capital markets in the future to raise external funds. Since payment of dividends prevents management from continuing to invest in bad projects, we should expect earnings and profitability to increase. However if the board decides on dividends, before management has a chance to overinvest, then it is difficult to predict and assess how future earnings will be relative and compared to past earnings Paying dividends result in lesser cash flow available in the hands of insiders (managers), which mitigate their ability to spend on projects which ben efit their own interest. If inside managers increase their common stock-ownership in the company, they will be keen on aligning their interest with shareholders interests; this will result in reducing equity agency cost. The higher common stocks held by managers, the more likely such owner-managers act in the interests of Shareholders and work on optimizing the companys value. Thus, a higher level of insider ownership will lead to lower agency problems and reduces the role of dividends as a monitoring tool to control for agency cost. Shareholders can utilize their legal powers in voting for Directors who offer better dividends policies, or by suing companies that spend too lavishly on activities that benefit only insiders. Good investor protection makes asset diversion legally riskier and more expensive for insiders. The greater the rights of the minority shareholders, the more the cash they can extract form the firm, other things equal. In the high protection countries shareh olders are able to extract dividends from companies by their ability to resist oppression rather than having any specific dividends rights. Generally, Shareholders, who feel protected, would accept low dividends, and high The investment policy of the firm cannot be taken as independent of its dividends policy, thus paying dividends may reduce the inefficiency of marginal investment. Also the allocation of profits to shareholders on pro rata basis cannot be taken for granted Firms in common law countries, where investors protection is better, make higher dividends than firm in civil law countries. Also, in common law countries, high growth firms make lower dividends than low growth countries.- Corporate and other laws grant outside investors, including shareholders, certain powers to protect their investment against expropriation by insiders. Power such as equality in receiving the same per share dividends as insiders, to the power to vote on important corporate matters. Common law countries appear to have better legal protection of minority shareholders, than civil law countries. Such better protection contributes to the efficiency of resource allocation and to economic growth. Reinvestment rates, from a company with good opportunities, as they know that when these investments pay off, they could extract high dividends. In contrast, if protection is poor, shareholders will try to get what they can. A firm must establish a reputation for moderation in expropriating shareholders, in order to have the chance and competences to raise funds from external resources at low cost and approach capital markets for funds. In countries with stronger shareholder protection, the need for reputational mechanism is weaker, and hence the need to pay dividends. Other things equal, dividends payout ratios should be higher in countries with weak legal protection than in those with strong protection. Firms with better growth prospects have a stronger incentive to establish a reputation. As they have need to raise fund from external resources. Thus firms with better growth prospects may choose higher dividends payout ratios than firms with poor growth prospects. The relationship between growth prospects and dividend payout is ambiguous, as in contrast to the above; firms with good growth prospects have a better use of funds than the ones with poor growth. In common law countries, payout ratios are strictly higher for slowly growing firms than rapidly growing ones. Results are consistent with the predications of the outcome of the Agency model, according to which well protected minority investors are happy with low dividend payout firms with good growth prospects In Civil law countries, in contrast, rapidly growing firms appear to pay higher dividends. On all measures of dividends payouts, countries with better shareholder protection have higher dividends payout ratios than do countries with worse protection. Within countries with good shareholder protection, high growth firms have lower dividends payout than low growth firms. Within countries with low shareholder protection, high growth firms have higher dividends payout than low growth firms. Agency approach is highly relevant to an understanding of corporate dividends policies. Signaling theory Firms with high future earnings and rewards would prefer announcing and signaling that to investors and outside parties in the market, while firms with low cash flow expectation will not declare or be able to do the same, as managers are not supposed to send wrong signals to the market. Investors can assume information about firms future earnings through the signal coming from dividend announcements, both in terms of the stability of, and changes in, dividends. The signaling hypothesis argues that special dividends provide a signal to investors of the firms improving potential earnings; Signaling theory could be tested through the company future increase in earnings.( Watts (1973).) Managers use special dividends to signal future operating performance for firms with high growth opportunities, and use special dividends to reduce agency costs for firms with low growth opportunities. The market reacts more strongly to the disbursement of excess cash flow by firms with low gro wth opportunities than it does to the announcement of a special dividend as a signal by firms with high growth opportunities. Also, the market reacts moderately to the special dividend announcement of a firm with higher growth opportunities and higher preannouncement cash flow, whereas the reaction is insignificant for firms with higher growth. Usually the stock market reacts positively to dividend announcement, when companies announce paying dividends the stock price moves up, we can say that there is a positive relation. Stock price react positively to any increase or special dividends, which enhance the signaling hypothesis, also it serve as an evident to the fact that mangers will be willing to pay dividend if they have faith in the company future earnings that it will steadily increase and grow, dividend also serve as a signal to future cash flow of the company, which reflect stability in future earning and positive cash flow vis versa. Lintner(1956). Lipson Maquieira and Megginson (1998) ( Kale Noe (1990). As managers are likely to have more information about the firms future prospects than outside investors, they may be able to use changes in dividends as a vehicle to communicate information to the financial market about a firms future earnings and growth. Outside Investors may perceive dividends as a reflection of the managers assessment of a firms performance and prospects. However, managers should possess private information about the firms prospects, and have incentives to convey such information to the market. Based on that, a signal should be true, that is, a firm with poor future prospects should not send false signals to the market by increasing dividends payments. Thus the market should be able to rely on the signal to differentiate among firms. If these conditions are fulfilled, the market should be able to react favorably to the announcements of dividends increase and unfavorably otherwise. (Al-Najjar and Hussainey 2009b). Div idend payout is an indication of the company historical healthy performance however future earnings could be negative, which means that company current positive performance could not be an indication of future performance. We can notice companies paying good dividends and in the coming years it could be in a financial squeeze and are not able to pay any dividend. (Benartzi et al. 1997). Companies with strong corporate governance will prefer to announce low dividend payout, in case there is potential future investment opportunities, on the contrary companies with poor corporate governance will prefer to announce high dividend payout since it acts as a signal that the company management is doing a good job for the shareholder interest. (.Aharony and Swary, 1980 ) . Pecking order Theory Companies will initially seek Retained Earnings to finance announced dividends, and then seek debt to borrow, if Retained Earnings are insufficient, instead of issuing new shares. Companies usually prefer internal funding on external one .Mayers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984). Financing comes from three sources: internal funds, debt and new equity, Companies prioritize their sources of income, first priority to Internal Financing, debt, and then finally raising of equity is the last resort. Raising capital through equity is not usually preferred means; since shareholders sometimes thought that managers believes that the company is overvalued they are trying to benefit from this mispricing, at that point investor will not be willing to place high value for the new issue. The issue of equity would signal lack of confidence in the board and that the stock price is overvalued. Thus such issue can lead to a drop in share price if stock price is overvalued, the issue of equity would be favored. Myers (1984) From the point of view of an outside Investor, Equity is more risky than outside Debt, as it will demand higher rate of return on Equity than on Debt, however from the prospective of those inside the company, Retained Earnings are better source of income than Debt, and debt is a better deal than equity finance. This theory maintains that business usually adhere to a certain hierarchy of financing sources and prefer internal financing, if available, and then will prefer debt over equity for external financing. New Equity means issuing shares, which results in bringing external ownership into the company. The issue of debt signals the boards confidence and trust that an investment is profitable and that the current stock price is undervalued. The companies will adhere to pecking order theory to finance its operations (Al-Najjar Hussauney, 2009b). As equity markets become larger and more liquid, dependence on marginal debt financing drops sig nificantly. In the presence of both debt and equity markets, the relative importance of debt (as captured by aggregate debt to equity ratio) appears to fall as economies grow. Transaction cost Theory Companies that enjoy low transaction costs of equity or debt issuance may be more willing to pay dividends than firms that have high transaction costs. A company will be willing to pay dividends when its internally generated funds are not completely utilized for investment purposes, and when it experiences low growth. Rozeff (1982). Larger companies possess the privilege of smaller transaction (issuing cost) because of economies of Scale. Companies size plays an important role in the dividend pay-out ratio. Larger companies have easier access to the capital market, which reduces their dependence on internally generated funding and allows for higher pay-out ratios Companies that have a low transaction cost of equity or debt issuance may be more willing to distribute cash dividends more than companies with high transaction cost. Firms that have low transaction costs of equity or debt issuance may be more inclined to distribute cash dividends than firms that have high transac tion costs. The more paid dividends the lower will be the agency cost incurred. However, the more paid dividends will lead to an increase in the transaction cost. If Shareholders seek a steady flow of income from their capital investment, then dividend payments would be the cheapest way to achieve such goal. The companies size will be an important determinant of the dividend policy, since the small companies would mainly rely on debts to finance their activities and payment of dividends, thus such small companies will face higher transactions cost than larger ones. If dividend payments will minimize transaction costs shareholders, then positive dividends payout would be optimal. There is an argument that, despite the fact that Transactions cost has dramatically been reduced, such reduction should have resulted in lower demand in dividends, as the alternative options have been reduced, but there is no apparent evidence of a shift or reduction in dividends payment which is related to such change in transaction cost. Such argument specifically applies to small investors who do not hold many shares, thus the cost of transaction will be higher. Bird in hand Theory The bird-in-the-hand may sound familiar as it is taken from an old saying: a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. In this theory the bird in the hand is referring to dividends and the bush is referring to capital gains. Dividend, as a general rule, increase firms value, Shareholders have preference for cash than future capital gain on which stocks to build a position in. Thus a divided payment is associated with increasing firms value investors prefer higher dividend which reduces uncertainty about future cash flows. A high payout ratio will reduce the cost of capital and thus increase share value (Gordon and Lintner, 1962). If company will increase its dividend payout ratio, shareholders became concerned about the firm future capital gain, since the retained earning will be negatively affect , this also could hinders management from potential future investment opportunities which could increase in future earnings One of the leading theories back then was the bird in hand theory and explicitly stating that investors prefer dividends as opposed to retained earnings as they viewed dividends to offer more certainty than retained earning which came second in terms of certainty and inevitability Current dividends are relatively more certain than future capital returns. Shareholders are risk averse and prefer to receive dividends in the present than to future capital gains (Gordon, 1962, Miller and Modiglianis 1961). Shareholders are not entitled to fixed returns. Current dividends are relatively more certain than future capital returns. Shareholders are risk averse and prefer to receive dividends in the present than to future capital gains. Investors values each dollar paid as a dividend four times as opposed to each dollar kept on as retained earnings; also it has greater and more positive effect on share performance. (Diamond, 1967 ). Literature Review. Share price and perfect market. Dividend policy has been a fertile topic of discussion since Miller and Modigliani (1961) imposed that dividends are irrelevant and have hardly any influence on a firms share price in the event of having a perfect capital market, a matter that has created great debate. Opposing practitioners to the Miller and Modiglianis theory declined this preposition by stating that a perfect capital market assumption does not exist and introduced competing theories and research to provide pragmatic evidence that dividends matter most in imperfect capital markets which are the case in real world and hence dividends do have an impact on a firms share price. Baker and Wurgler (2004) companies are willing to initiate dividend when the stock prices react positively when deciding initiating dividend. When the market positively reacts with initiating dividend and adds premium to the stocks value. Fama and French (2001), Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002), and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and St ulz (2006)). Explains the life cycle theory for dividend payment, which shows that companies with high retained earnings compared to its total asset will be willing to initiate dividend Taxes. Sighting this debate from a tax preference angle we shall dig deep in the 1970s and 1980s where several research suggested that dividends are more disposed to higher tax cut than capital gains. (Brennan, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979; Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982; Kalay, 1982; John and Williams, 1985; Poterba and Summers, 1984; Miller and Rock, 1985; Ambarish et al., 1987) and that dividends are taxed directly but capital gains will be taxed/realized only when the stocks are sold and hence investors are more prone to keep a companys profit as opposed to distributing a cash dividend for tax related concerns. The benefit behind the tax treatment in capital gains may lead investors to prefer a low dividend payout. However this does not apply to Egypt as of yet since there is no tax charged on neither dividends nor capital gains. But this matter has been proposed for implication especially amid the January 25th revolution a matter that abolish ed economic stability with the government it brought down leading to an increase in the balance of payment deficit. Despite the turbulence arousing, all successive governments who normally disagree on one view came to unite in solving this problem by suggesting the imposition of taxes to both dividends and capital gains in attempts to increase its financial resources. Ownership structure. Among other determinants is the ownership structure where a correlation between ownership structure and dividend performance existed which is normally referred to the Agency problem in (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986), which imposes that idea that dividends provide an indirect means of control to the management of a firm. Jensen and Meckling (1976) focused on the issue of Agency Cost Hypothesis and stated that dividend limits the cash under insiders management, therefore leaving them under tough capital market analysis. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that agency cost might be reduced if insiders increase their ownership in the firm by making the managers the eventual owners of company yet this ultimate ownership by management will lead to a conflict of interest between the management and outsiders since the insiders will make efforts to collect more cash under their management either by reducing payment of dividends or by continuously paying out dividends at a at low level bear ing in mind the tax consideration above in developed markets. Glen et al. (1995), Gul (1999a), Naser et al. (2004) and Al-Malkawi (2007) point out that in government ownership in emerging markets is major element of the dividend decision-making process. Gul (1999a) proposed a positive relationship between government ownership and dividends, debating that firms with high Government ownership face less hurdles in financing investment projects, and accordingly can afford to pay more dividends. On the contrary, firms with limited or no government ownership face difficulties in raising money, and instead rely on retained earnings for investments by paying small dividends. Legal Protection Text Glen et al. (1995) stated that shareholders in countries with poor legal protection need to be protected. Governments are normally heavy weighted investors and accordingly they should defend minority investors through observing the directors and forcing them to expel cash. Naser et al. (2004) added that in emerging market, there is a poor legal protection for investors; governments plays important role in order to build up a solid firm reputation where there is no abuse of minority shareholders by paying out large dividends. They further stressed building this reputation has substantial on emerging exchanges where the minority shareholders are suffering. Al-Malkawi (2007) communicated that the government plays an important role on behalf of its citizen who do not manage firm. The government was found to be the most the most powerful in influencing the dividend policy especially among large shareholders in firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. Accordingly in firms like the one discussed above a conflict might exist that is normally referred to as a double principal-agent conflict. This conflict may happen between citizens and government representatives or managers and government representatives in case the former does not act in the latters best interest. This problem could be solved through the payout of a larger dividend value which shrinks the cash flow available to managers and accordingly minimizing the agency problems of the firm. This explanation concurs with the study carried by Gugler (2003) who examined the dividend policies in Australian firms. Wrapping up the above there is a clear positive correlation between the dividend payout and the government ownership where the percent of shares owned by the government can be an indicator to the companys ownership structure. Free cash Flow. The percent of shares held by various types of shareholders is not being the only determinant of the dividend-agency framework; the free cash flow may also be of great significance. Jensen (1986) defined free cash flow as the cash flow in surplus of the funds essential for all projects with a positive net present value (NPV). He proved that as the increase in free cash flow escalates the agency conflict between the interests between the management and outside shareholders leading to a decrease in the performance of the company. While shareholders require their managers to maximize the value of their shares, the managers may have a conflicting interest and prefer to derive benefits for themselves. Jensens free cash flow hypothesis has been reinforced by studies by Jensen et al. (1992) and Smith and Watts (1992). La Porta et al. (2000) added that when a firm has a free cash flow, its managers will engage in extravagant practices. Various studies have argues that firms with a greater free cash flow need to pay more dividends to lower the agency costs of the free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Holder et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 2000; and Mollah et al., 2002). Based on the above studies there is a positive relationship between the free cash flow and the dividend payout ratio and hence the dividend payout is positively associated with free cash flow. The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis (imposed by Jensen 1986) stipulated that companies normally focus on finding opportunities in new project to generate income profitability where the focus on dividend payout is less prior and is normally financed off the residual balance. Given this debate, the concept of complete separation between ownership and management is the most alluring to avoid conflict of interest between both parties. A study by Afza and Slahudin, 2009 concluded that the more profitable investment opportunities the less efficiency in the use of cash resources by management. the firms financial competence and liquidity position are considered key determinants of the dividend value. Companies facing liquidity squeeze will be more prone to pay out a stock dividend versus a cash dividend since paying stock dividends will not burden the companys liquidity status. Paying dividends in the form of stocks will lead to the company to increase its number of outstanding shares which directly hits the shareholders value and hence forces the company to strive more to increase its profit by at least the same percentages of increase in its shares to avoid dilution of its EPS. Company Size. The size of a firm plays an integral role on the level of financial constraint the firm is facing and accordingly is considered a key factor in determining the dividend amount paid out by such company. The bigger the firms size the higher value of their assets and hence it is easier for them to obtain funds through external capital markets whether by debt or equity. Large size firms also do not lower the amount the pay out as dividend to finance future profitable projects they are normally able to do both unless in its extremely inevitable for them. Small firms on the contrary, have restricted access to external debt or equity markets try to increase the amount of funds generated internally by growing their retention ratio which lowers the dividend payout ratio in an attempt to increase cash in hand to finance its new projects. Eddy and Seifert (1988), Jensen et al. (1992), Redding (1997), and Fama and French (2000) indicated that large firms allocate a higher amount of their net profits as dividends as opposed to small firms. Numerous studies have verified the influence of firm size on the dividend-agency association. Lloyd et al. (1985) were among the leaders to adjust Rozeffs model by adding firm size as an supplementary variable. They considered it an important descriptive constituent, as large companies are more likely to increase their dividend payouts to lower their agency costs. Their adjustment to the Rozeff model actually supports Jensen and Mecklings (1976) debate that stated that agency costs are connected with firm size. They supported the idea that for large firms the ownership structure has a bargaining control which hence increases agency costs. Adding to this, Sawicki (2005) demonstrated that dividend payments can help to indirectly monitor managers performance in large firms. In large firms, information irregularity surges due to ownership dispersal, shrinking the shareholders capability to control the internal and exter nal activities of the firm. This result in a decreased inefficient control by the management where paying out a large dividend value can be a solution to this problem since it escalates the need for external financing which accordingly leads to more control on these firms from external creditors. Holder et al. (1998) communicated illustrated in a study that a positive relation exists between dividends, firm sizes and transaction costs. The study revealed that larger firms have better access to capital markets and accordingly have easier access to raise funds at low costs which allows a payout of higher dividends. Leverage. The firms capital structure and leverage also affect its dividend decisions. A study by Darling (1957) debated that highly leveraged companies need more cash and liquidity to meet its future payment obligations. Also high leveraged company are normally threaten by liquidity shortage and accordingly are subject to insolvency due to the extended burden on the companys liquidity position and the non-payment of interest which normally reduces the companys cash flows available for dividend payments making having high debt ratio companies pay low dividends (Rozef, 1982) Profitability. On the other hand, companies profitability is an important measure of dividend payout determinant. Lintner (1956) found that companies net profits are important determinant of dividend change and De Angelo Et. Al (1992) claimed that current profit is a critical determinant of dividend decision. This is why managers are unwilling to lower dividend payout ratios unless when earnings are very low; also the more profits generated by a company the more dividends it pays out. Mayers and Frank, 2008 Fama and French (200). In line with Fama and French (2001), we concluded that companies who pays dividend always profitable large companies, on the other hand this relation is not always the case across different countries it could be different. The fact that the ownership of firms isnt diversified or slashed into small group creates the burden of financial tunneling as major shareholders strive to work for the benefit of their big stakes which normally conflicts with the benefit of the firm and smaller shareholders exploiting the financial capabilities for their interest. Research Gap. From the previous studies we found that there isnt any study that analyze or examine determinates of dividend policy of the Egyptian listed companies. Methodology In the last chapter I find that there is a research gap, since there isnt any studies which examine or analyze the determinates of dividend policy of the Egyptian listed companies (most active) Research Questions Accordingly, we can say that our research question is what are the main determinates of dividend policy for the Egyptian listed stocks EGX 100) Research Objectives 3.2.1. Determining theoretical back ground of dividend policy. 3.2.2. Determining the historical back ground of dividend policy. 3.2.3. Scanning literature review regarding determinants of dividend policy 3.2.4. Discover main determinants of dividend policy. 3.2.5. Studying the effect of each determinates of dividend policy. 3.2.6. Studying the relative importance of each determinates of dividend policy. 3.2.7. Directing the other researchers towards the future researched dividend policy. 3.2.8. Studying the effect of each determinates of dividend policy. 3.2.9. Studying the effect of each determinates of dividend policy. Research Model Profitability Leverage Ownership structure Free Cash flow Control Variables Industry. Size Determinants (Independent) Cash Dividend. Dividends (Dependent) Stock Dividend. The Independent Variables: Size: continuous quantitative variable Leverage: Continuous quantitative variable ranges from 0 to 1. Cash flow : Continuous quantitative Variable Profitability: Continuous quantitative variable ranges from 0 to 1. The Industry : Nominal variable contains 29 industry The Ownership Structure: Binary Variables contains 2 categories 0 for the companies which is More than 50% of ownership is Anchor or institutional, and 1 for the companies which is More than 50% of ownership is Retail. The Dependent variables: The cash Dividend. : a continuous variable The Stock Dividend. Binary variable contains 2 categories 0 no stock dividends and 1 yes. Hypotheses 3.4.1. There is a positive relation between the company size dividends paid. 3.4.2. There is a positive relation between the company profitability dividend paid. 3.4.3. There is a negative relation between intuitional ownership dividend paid. 3.4.4. There is a positive relation between retail ownership dividend paid. 3.4.5. There is a positive relation between the company free cash flow and divided paid 3.4.6. There is a negative relation between the company leverage and dividend paid 3.4.7. There is a positive relation between the company size and dividend paid Population and sample In this research paper we gathered data for the most active listed companies, about 100 companies included in the EGX 100ondex. Data Collection Our sample is prepared using data gathered from Bloomberg Mubasher; the sample includes all firms included in the EGX 100 .Bloomberg offers information on total assets, ROE, ROA, Free Cash flow, Leverage, ownership structure for years 2006 till 2011. Research limitation Though this paper was cautiously prepared, I believe that there are some limitations. The number of Egyptian listed stocks is limited. Companies do not report its financials in unified shape Lack of companys historical financials since Egypt is considered as emerging market. Lack of data sources. During the last 5 years a lot of profitable companies were bought by anchor or institutional investors which limits and change the number of active and profitable companies in the study. Data Analysis, Results and recommendations In this section of the research we will examine the hypothesis. As stated previously, this paper used historical data for the stocks include in the EGX 100 and special statistical techniques (multiple-regression) to study the correlation between variables in addition examine hypotheses Descriptive Statistics Table: Descriptive Statistics of The Variables Included in the investigation: N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Size (in what Unit for ex millions) 479 3.8795 94952 6060 14136 LEVERAGE % 376 .0001 735 59.5 91.3 Cash Flow (in what Unit for ex millions) 463 -363 113.80 -2.497 33.9891 Profitability % 427 -127.33 161.9773 16.051 19.789 Cash Dividend (in what Unit for ex millions) 588 .000 310.480 1.07201 12.8896 The means of SIZE, LEVERAGE, CASH FLOW, and CASH DIVIDENDS are 6060, -2.479, 16.051, and 1.07201 respectively. These variables have high variability as measured by standard deviations of 14136, 91.3, 33.99, and 12.89, respectively. But, the mean of the PROPFITABILITY is 16.051, and has low variability, as measured by a standard deviation of 19.789.These higher degrees of variability indicate that there are large differences among companies. Table: Frequency Table f or Stock Dividend variable: Frequency Percent Valid No 508 86.4 Yes 80 13.6 Total 588 100.0 86.4% of the companies dont give stock dividends while only 13.6% do. Table: Frequency Table for ownership variable: Frequency Percent Valid 50% Retail 348 59.2 = 50% Retail 240 40.8 Total 588 100.0 40.8% of the companies with more than 50% Retail ownership while 60% of the companies with more than 50% Anchor or institutional ownership. Table: Frequency Table for industry variable: Industry Frequency Percent Valid Percent Valid 1 42 7.1 7.1 2 30 5.1 5.1 3 18 3.1 3.1 4 30 5.1 5.1 5 138 23.5 23.5 6 54 9.2 9.2 7 12 2.0 2.0 8 6 1.0 1.0 9 6 1.0 1.0 11 6 1.0 1.0 12 30 5.1 5.1 13 12 2.0 2.0 14 30 5.1 5.1 15 12 2.0 2.0 16 18 3.1 3.1 17 12 2.0 2.0 18 24 4.1 4.1 19 36 6.1 6.1 20 6 1.0 1.0 21 6 1.0 1.0 22 6 1.0 1.0 23 6 1.0 1.0 24 6 1.0 1.0 25 6 1.0 1.0 26 6 1.0 1.0 27 6 1.0 1.0 28 12 2.0 2.0 29 6 1.0 1.0 30 6 1.0 1.0 Total 588 100.0 100.0 Correlation First Studding the effect of The Independent Variables on the Cash Dividends: Table: Pearson Coefficient Correlation Matrix: Profitability Cash Flow LEVERAGE Size Cash Dividend Profitability Pearson Correlation 1 .129** .043 .199** .026 Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .422 .000 .586 N 427 407 344 427 427 Cash Flow Pearson Correlation .129** 1 .049 -.097* .014 Sig. (2-tailed) .009 .365 .040 .758 N 407 463 350 443 463 LEVERAGE Pearson Correlation .043 .049 1 .104* .018 Sig. (2-tailed) .422 .365 .043 .732 N 344 350 376 376 376 Size Pearson Correlation .199** -.097* .104* 1 .147** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .040 .043 .001 N 427 443 376 479 479 Cash Dividend Pearson Correlation .026 .014 .018 .147** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .586 .758 .732 .001 N 427 463 376 479 588 Cash Dividend Vs Profitability: Sinc e P-value =0.586 which is greater than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 so we dont reject Ho: ÃÆ' Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ =0 i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant relationship between Cash Dividend Profitability i.e. they are independent. Cash Dividend Vs Cash flow: Since P-value =0.758 which is greater than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 so we dont reject Ho: ÃÆ' Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ =0 i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant relationship between Cash Dividend Cash flow i.e. they are independent. Cash Dividend Vs leverage: Since P-value =0.732 which is greater than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 so we dont reject Ho: ÃÆ' Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ =0 i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant relationship between Cash Dividend Leverage i.e. they are independent. Cash Dividend Vs Size: Since P-value =0.001 which is less than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 so we reject Ho: ÃÆ' Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ =0 i.e. we are 95% confident that there is significant linear weak relationship between Cash Dividend Size with ÃÆ' Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ =0.147 Table : Eta measure for association between Cash Dividend and Industry: Value Nominal by Interval Eta Cash Dividend Dependent .082 Industry Dependent .593 Using Eta Measure it seems there a weak relationship between Cash Dividend and Industry. Table : Cramers V measure for association between Cash Dividend and Industry: Value Approx. Sig. Cramers V .572 .000 Since P-value 0.0005, we reject Ho: Independence I.e. there is an intermediate relationship between Industry and Cash Dividend. From The above Tables we deduce that 2 variables only would be used in the regression model: The Size of the Company. The Industry. To be used in the regression, The Variable of Industry would be reco ded into New 29 variable to have a binary variable represent each sector with value 1 if the company belongs to that sector and 0 otherwise. Regression The Variables Entered to the model: Model Variables Entered 1 Size Table : Goodness of fit Model Adjusted R Square 1 .020 This Model Explains 2% of the variations in Cash dividend variable, i.e its a poor fit model. Table : The Significance of The model: Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F 1 Regression 2112.156 1 2112.156 10.575 Residual 95272.863 477 199.733 Total 97385.019 478 a. Predictors: (Constant), Size b. Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend Since p-value = 0.001 which is less than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 we are 95 % confident that the model is significant. Table : the Significance of the Coefficients: Beta 1 (Constant) .402 Size .147 Since the p-value of the constant Coefficient ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ²o equals 0.568 i.e. More than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 Then we dont reject Ho: ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ²o=0 Since the p-value of the constant Coefficient ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ €šÃ‚ ²1 equals 0.001 i.e. less than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 Then we reject Ho: ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ²1=0 I.e. when the size of the company increases by one unit the cash Dividend would increase by 0.147 units. Table : The Excluded Variables From the model: Model Beta In t Sig. Partial Correlation Co linearity Statistics Tolerance 1 Ownership structure -.047a -1.034 .302 -.047 .995 sec2 -.003a -.073 .942 -.003 .995 sec3 -.006a -.126 .900 -.006 .997 sec4 .008a .174 .862 .008 .994 sec5 .077a 1.714 .087 .078 .999 sec6 .014a .307 .759 .014 .986 sec7 .005a .104 .917 .005 .999 sec8 -.002a -.037 .970 -.002 .999 sec9 -.003a -.070 .944 -.003 .999 sec11 -.008a -.186 .852 -.009 1.000 sec12 -.095a -1.899 .058 -.087 .819 sec13 -.002a -.045 .964 -.002 .996 sec14 -.023a -.498 .619 -.023 .997 sec15 -.006a -.143 .886 -.007 .998 sec16 -.011a -.244 .807 -.011 .999 sec17 -.004a -.087 .931 -.004 .997 sec18 -.033a -.670 .503 -.031 .851 sec19 -.003a -.058 .954 -.003 .991 sec20 -.018a -.403 .687 -.018 .991 sec21 -.008a -.168 .867 -.008 1.000 sec22 .004a .093 .926 .004 .998 sec23 -.003a -.057 .955 -.003 .998 sec24 -.006a -.133 .894 -.006 .999 sec25 .003a .076 .940 .003 .998 sec26 .004a .090 .929 .004 1.000 sec27 -.002a -.050 .960 -.002 .999 sec28 -.004a -.083 .934 -.004 .997 sec29 -.003a -.065 .949 -.003 .998 sec30 -.002a -.033 .973 -.002 .998 Since P-value of All the variables in the above table is more than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±= 0.05 So all t he coefficients are insignificant so all this variable have no significant effect on the Cash dividend so they are excluded from the model b. Dependent Variable: Cash Dividend The prediction Model: (Expected Cash Dividends)= (0.147) (Size) SECOND: Studding the Effect of The independent variables on the Stock Dividend: Table : Comparing Means of Profitability between Companies give Stock Dividends and Companies dont: Levenes Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. Profitability Equal variances assumed 4.040 .045 Equal variances not assumed Since P-value of Levenes test =0.045 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho i.e. we assume equal variances Since P-value =0.797 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho: My=Mn i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant difference in profitability between The Companies that give Stock Dividends and the Companies that dont give on average. I.e. profitability and stock dividend are independent. Table : Comparing Means of leverage between Companies give Stock Dividends and Companies dont: Levenes Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. LEVERAGE Equal variances assumed 1.321 .251 Equal variances not assumed Since P-value of Levenes test =0.251 which i s ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho i.e. we assume equal variances Since P-value =0.322 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho: My=Mn i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant difference in leverage between The Companies that give Stock Dividends and the Companies that dont give on average. I.e. leverage and stock dividend are independent. Table : Comparing Means of Cash flows between Companies give Stock Dividends and Companies dont: Levenes Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. Cash Flow Equal variances assumed .282 .596 Equal variances not assumed Since P-value of Levenes test = 0.596 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho i.e. we assume equal variances Since P-value =0.759 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho: My=Mn i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant difference in Cash flows between The Companies that give Stock Div idends and the Companies that dont give on average. I.e. Cash flows and stock dividend are independent. Table : Comparing Means of Size between Companies give Stock Dividends and Companies dont: Levenes Test for Equality of Variances F Sig. Size Equal variances assumed 4.249 .040 Equal variances not assumed Since P-value of Levenes test = 0.04 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho i.e. we assume equal variances Since P-value =0.224 which is ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±/2 =0.025 then we dont reject Ho: My=Mn i.e. we are 95% confident that there is no significant difference in Size between The Companies that give Stock Dividends and the Companies that dont give on average. I.e. Size and stock dividend are independent. Table : Measuring the association between Industry and Stock Dividend: Value Approx. Sig. Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric .023 .024 stock dividend Dependent .095 .024 Industry Dep endent .013 .024 With Stock Dividend dependent. Since P-value = 0.024 which is less than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 we reject Ho: independence we are 95% confident that Industry and STOCK DIVIDENDS are associated Table : Measuring the association between Ownership structure and Stock Dividend: Value Approx. Sig. Ordinal by Ordinal Gamma .040 .743 Since P-value = 0.743 which is less than ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 we dont reject Ho: independence we are 95% confident that build and .private are independent. From the above tables we assume that all the variables cant be included in the logistic regression model except for Industry. The Logistic  Regression: Table : the dependent Variable: Original Value Internal Value no 0 yes 1 The Variable of Industry would be recoded into New 28 variable with base category sector 1 to have a binary variable represent each sector with value 1 if the company belongs to that sector and 0 otherwise. Table: Variables Excluded from the Model: Variables not in the Equation Score df Step 0 Variables Industry 38.176 28 Industry(1) 1.607 1 Industry(2) 1.295 1 Industry(3) 3.173 1 Industry(4) 1.100 1 Industry(5) 1.438 1 Industry(6) 1.943 1 Industry(7) 1.929 1 Industry(8) .955 1 Industry(9) .955 1 Industry(10) .955 1 Industry(11) 10.467 1 Industry(12) .290 1 Industry(13) .252 1 Industry(14) .098 1 Industry(15) 1.173 1 Industry(16) .098 1 Industry(17) 3.940 1 Industry(18) .907 1 Industry(19) .955 1 Industry(20) .955 1 Industry(21) .048 1 Industry(22) .048 1 Industry(23) 2.007 1 Industry(24) .048 1 Industry(25) 2.007 1 Industry(26) .048 1 Industry(27) .290 1 Industry(28) .955 1 Overall Statistics 38.176 28 Table : Goodness of fit Chi-square df Sig. Step 1 Step 44. 609 28 .024 Model 44.609 28 .024 Since p-value of step wise =0.024 ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 since p-value of model 0.024 ÃÆ'Ã… ½Ãƒâ€šÃ‚ ±=0.05 Then, the model is significant Step Nagelkerke R Square 1 .133 This Model Explains 13.3% of variations in the dependent variable. Table : The Classification table: Classification Tablea,b Observed Predicted stock dividend no yes Step 0 stock dividend no 508 0 yes 80 0 Overall Percentage A. Constant is included in the model. b. The cut value is .500 The model succeeded to classify all the observations of category 2 but failed to classify any in category 1 which means the model is imbalanced. Variables in the Equation B S.E. Wald df Sig. Step 1a Industry 20.461 28 .847 Industry(1) -.956 1.249 .586 1 .444 Industry(2) -1.030 1.317 .611 1 .434 Industry(3) .654 1.215 .290 1 .591 Industry(4) .223 1.187 .035 1 .851 Industry(5) .000 1.119 .000 1 1.000 Industry(6) -.916 1.212 .571 1 .450 Industry(7) -19.593 1.160E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(8) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(9) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(10) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(11) .916 1.162 .622 1 .430 Industry(12) -.788 1.514 .271 1 .602 Industry(13) .000 1.200 .000 1 1.000 Industry(14) .000 1.342 .000 1 1.000 Industry(15) .357 1.233 .084 1 .772 Industry(16) .000 1.342 .000 1 1.000 Industry(17) -19.593 8.2 04E3 .000 1 .998 Industry(18) -.788 1.250 .398 1 .528 Industry(19) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(20) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Industry(21) .000 1.549 .000 1 1.000 Industry(22) .000 1.549 .000 1 1.000 Industry(23) .916 1.396 .431 1 .512 Industry(24) .000 1.549 .000 1 1.000 Industry(25) .916 1.396 .431 1 .512 Industry(26) .000 1.549 .000 1 1.000 Industry(27) -.788 1.514 .271 1 .602 Industry(28) -19.593 1.641E4 .000 1 .999 Constant -1.609 1.095 2.159 1 .142 a. 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